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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS: A VIABLE
MEANS OF SETTLEMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
A policy advocating out of court settlement is deeply seated in the
law.' Settlement allows a plaintiff to quickly secure money damages
for his injury, often alleviates the need for complex multi-party litiga-
tion, avoids the costs of litigation, and eases the burden of an already
crowded docket. Settlement agreements have taken various forms and
their substance is limited only by the ingenuity of the settling parties.2
In suits involving multiple defendants, peculiar problems may arise
when a settlement is made between the plaintiff and one or more, but
less than all, the defendants The most pressing of these problems is
1. "Agreements settling litigation are solemn undertakings, invoking a duty upon the in-
volved lawyers, as officers of the court, to make every reasonable effort to see that the agreed terms
are fully and timely carried out. Public policy strongly favors settlement of disputes without liti-
gation." Aro Corp. v. Allied Witman Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976). "[S]ettlement
agreements are highly favored in the law and will be upheld whenever possible because they are a
means of amicably resolving doubts and preventing lawsuits." Pearson v. Ecological Science
Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 1975), citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Loflin, 440 F.2d 1213, 1215
(5th Cir. 1971). "The policy of the law encourages compromise to avoid the uncertainties of the
outcome of litigation as well as the avoidance of wasteful litigation and expense incident thereto."
Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 543 (8th Cir. 1972). "Voluntary settlement of civil controversies
is in high judicial favor." Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See gener-
ally 154 CJ.S. Compromise and Settlement § 23 (1967).
2. See notes 4-91 infra and accompanying text for a discussion on the release, the covenant
not to sue, the covenant not to execute, the loan receipt, and the Mary Carter, all of which are
various forms of settlement agreements. While "it has been stated that there are as many agree-
ments as there are ingenious trial counsel," Lageson, Guarantee and Loan Receipt Agreements In
Multi Party Litigation, 42 J. AIR. L. 85, 86 (1976), the allowable ingenuity is certainly limited by
public policy considerations. See notes 26-91 infra and accompanying text which deals with the
Mary Carter agreement and policy limitations on its substance. Not considering the public policy
considerations, Maule Indus. Inc. v. Roundtree, 264 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1972), rev'd, 284 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1973), found "the number of variations of the so-called Mary Carter agreement is limited
only by the ingenuity of counsel and the willingness of the parties to sign. . . ." Id. at 447.
Referring to Mary Carter agreements one author finds "[t]his innovative scheme is the most flex-
ible device to date. With it an endless variety of provisions may be molded to a particular fact
situation." Comment, Settlement Devices With Joint Tortfeasors, FLA. L. REv. 762, 773 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Settlement Devices].
3. Prosser finds that two particular problems arise. First, what will be the effect of the
agreement on the plaintiffs' relationship with the non-settling defendants? Will the plaintiff still
1
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the effect the settlement will have on those defendants who did not
enter into the agreement and the ability of the settling parties, if left
unfettered, to prejudice the non-settling defendants' chances for a fair
trial.
This comment will examine the methods of settlement available
and the pros and cons of each. The traditional methods of settlement
will be given only brief treatment. The focus will be on the newest
form of settlement, the Mary Carter agreement, and the problems it
presents. These problems are a result of the tension between two com-
peting policies: the desire to promote out of court settlement, and the
desire to maintain the adversarial setting of a trial with the parties' ac-
tual positions known.
In order to accommodate these competing policies a compromise
position must be assumed. Various approaches will be considered as a
means for reaching such a position with suggestions as to the most at-
tractive alternatives.
II. THE FORMS OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
.4. The Release
Settlement agreements may take many forms. Of these, the oldest
and most traditional is the release. When a plaintiff executes a release,
he effectively surrenders his claim by extinguishing his legal right to
proceed against the defendant.4 The release may be gratuitous or for
be able to proceed against the non-settling defendants? See note 4 infra and accompanying text.
Second, what effect will the agreement have on the relationship between the settling and non-
settling defendants? Prosser finds more difficulty arising from this second problem than any other.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, §§ 49-50 (4th ed. 1971). For a suggested solu-
tion to this problem, see UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs AcT § 4 (providing that
the settling defendant is absolved from all liability which he may have to the non-settling defend-
ants); Tino v. Stout, 49 N.J. 289, 229 A.2d 793, 799-800 (1967) (if settlement agreement provided
for a pro-rata reduction in remaining defendants' liability then settling defendant is absolved from
all liability he may have to non-settling defendants, else there is a pro tanto reduction and settling
defendant has liability to non-settling defendants for a right of contribution); Theobald v.
Angelos, 44 N.J. 228, 208 A.2d 129 (1964) (settling defendant must remain in lawsuit and have his
liability litigated). If the settling defendant is found to have liability the judgment is reduced pro-
rata. If the settling defendant is found to have no liability the judgment is reduced pro-tanto. In
either situation, the settling defendant has no liability to the non-settling defendants. Id. at -, 208
A.2d at 136.
4. "Although all the joint tortfeasors were jointly and severally liable, a plaintiff had but a
single, indivisible cause of action which was extinguished by a release. . . against any one of the
wrongdoers, thus eliminating plaintiffs right to sue others." Recent Development, Release To One
Tort-Feasor Held Not To Bar Suit Against Others Liable For Same Injury, 63 COLUM. L. REv.
1142, 1143 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Release To One Tort-Feasor]; "The injured party had a
single cause of action against the wrongdoers, and when he released one of them this single cause
of action was extinguished." Recent Cases, Torts-Joint Tortfeasos-Release Of One Not 4 Re-
1979]
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consideration.
An attribute of the release which diminishes its appeal is the fact
that, at common law, a release of one defendant released all other joint
tortfeasors5  There have been numerous attempts to justify this rule6
but it has been rightly condemned by courts and commentators alike.
Adherance to this common law rule discourages the plaintiff from set-
lease OfAll, 12 VAND. L. REV. 1414, 1415 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Joint Tor//easors]. See
generally W. Prosser, supra note 3, § 49; Mead, Releases and Covenants Not To Sue, 30 ALA. LAW.
368 (1969).
5. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 49 n.96; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885 (1939); Havinghurst,
The Effect ofSettlement With One Co-Obligor Upon the Obligations of Others, 45 CORNELL L.Q. I,
I n. 1 (1959); Comment, Torts.- Release ofJoint andSuccessive Tort-Feasors in Oklahoma, 15 OKLA
L. REV. 97 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Tort Feasors in Oklahoma]; Note, Release. Action Not
BarredAgainst Concurrent Tortfeasors, 14 SYRACuSE L. REV. 526, 527 (1963) (finding this to also
be the law in England, citing Coke v. Jennor, Hobble, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614)).
6. Havinghurst gives the following reasons for the common law release rule: (1) construc-
tion of the instrument against the releasor; (2) the limitation of the claimant to one satisfaction; (3)
the difficulties presented by the right of contribution; (4) the unitary character of the obligation.
Havinghurst, supra note 5, at 3-7. Comment, Release of One Tort Feasor Not a Release of Others
When Tort Feasors Are Independent and Successive, 51 DEN. L.J. 285, 286 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Release ofOne Tort Feasor]. See also Settlement Devices, supra note 2, at 767; Comment, The
Release ofOne Tortfeasor Does Not Release Others in South Carolina, 24 S.C. L. REV. 293 (1972);
Recent Cases, Release-Construction and Operation-Joint Tortfeasors, 38 N.D. L. REv. 356, 357
(1962). But see Tort-Feasors in Oklahoma, supra note 5, where the author recognizes the fallacies
present in the reasons given to support the common law release rule and gives the following
reasons for abolishing it: (1) the rule stifles compromise since each wrongdoer wants to wait until
the other settles; (2) it gives tortfeasors an advantage inconsistent with the nature of their liability;
(3) the wrongdoer who makes no attempt to settle is rewarded at the expense of the one who
makes a partial settlement; (4) in applying the rule, the courts have disregarded the language of
the release and the intent of the parties in executing it; (5) it provides a trap for the innocent
plaintiff whereby he may be deprived of full compensation; (6) its result is generally unjust and
unintended. Id (footnote omitted).
7. "It is not possible to visualize any reasonable or compelling justification for persisting in
the application of this harsh and unrealistic rule except on the basis of ancient formalisms, the
reasons for which no longer prevail." Cox v. Pearl Investment Co., 450 P.2d 60, 63 (Colo. 1973).
Sanderson v. Hughes, 526 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ct. App. Ky. 1975), where dissenting, Reed, J., takes
an interesting approach by putting the burden on the non-settling tortfeasors to show the release is
in full satisfaction of the claims. "[If] plaintiffhas relinquished his claim against one tortfeasor for
only partial compensation and without any intent to release the other tortfeasor, it would seem
equally abhorrent to any current sense of justice to absolve the wrongdoer who paid nothing
whatever towards the plaintiffs damages and who merely stood by while his co-tortfeasor fairly
effected a compromise for himself." Brien v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665, 671 (N.J. 1958).
"Being untrammeled by the ancient rule which, in our view, tends to stifle settlements, defeat the
intention of the parties, and extole technicality, we adopt the view that the release of one
tortfeasor does not release the other.... Bartholomew v. McCartha, 255 S.C. 489, -, 179
S.E.2d 912, 914 (1971). See also O'Bryan v. Peterson, 563 S.W.2d 732 (Ct. App. Ky. 1977); Save-
lich Logging Co. v. Preston Mill Co., 265 Or. 467, -, 509 P.2d 1179, 1184 (1973); Havinghurst,
supra note 5; Comment, Joint Torts and SeveralLiability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413, 425 (1937) [herein-
after cited as Joint Torts]; Settlement Devices, supra note 2. "Nothing but false logic prevents a
complete repudiation of this principle." Comment, Release to One Joint-Torteasor, 17 ILL. L.
REv. 563, 564 (1923). The common law release doctrine is "illogical and worked injustice from its
inception." Joint Tortfeasors, supra note 4, at 1417.
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tling with any of the joint defendants.' In a situation where there exists
clear liability of more than one of the defendants there would be no
reason for the plaintiff to settle with any of them, particularly when
there exists joint and several liability.9 In light of the harsh conse-
quences to the plaintiff, most jurisdictions have either abandoned the
common law release rule or have abrogated it, thereby lifting the bur-
den the rule places on the plaintiff.'0
8. For a discussion of the differences and similarities ofjoint and concurrent tortfeasors and
primary and secondary liability, see generally Witucke v. Presque Isle Bank, 68 Mich. App. 599,
243 N.W.2d 907 (1976); Joint Torts, supra note 7.
9. The common law rule on releases "compels the plaintiff either to forego any opportunity
of obtaining what he can get from one defendant without suit or give up his entire claim against
the other without full compensation. The argument that the plaintiff should not be permitted to
make piecemeal collections from different defendants is pointless when he is allowed to do pre-
cisely that after judgment." Sanderson v. Hughes, 526 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ct. App. Ky. 1975). See
also Christianson v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., 7 Wash. App. 309, 499 P.2d 72 (1972), where the court
found that the common law release approach discourages settlement and, by adopting the ap-
proach taken by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885, it would "foster settlement and reduce litiga-
tion." Id. at __, 499 P.2d at 74. "Anytime the unwitting victim of multiple wrongdoers released
one of them for what seemed to him to be a roughly pro-rata share of his damages, the victim later
discovered that he was foreclosed from collecting the balance of his damages from the other
wrongdoers." Release of One Tort Feasor, supra note 6, at 286. The common law rule "on re-
leases. . . tends to discourage rather than encourage settlement, even though compromise is gen-
erally encouraged." Note, Effect of Release of One Tortfeasor Upon Liability of the Other, Where
the Parties to the Release Didnot Intend any Effect, 11 DRAKE L. REV. 151, 156 (1963).
10. The common law rule on releases is now followed in only Virginia and Illinois. Cotman
v. Whitehead, 209 Va. 377, 164 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1968) (court expressly recognized the conflict but
continued to follow the common law rule); Berkson v. Quality Beauty Supply Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d
877, -, 344 N.E.2d 629, 632 (1976). Prosser failed to recognize Illinois as a state maintaining the
common law rule on releases. Rather, he recognized Virginia and Washington as jurisdictions
maintaining the common law rule on releases. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 49. But see Christian-
son v. Fayette R. Plumb Inc., 7 Wash. 309, 499 P.2d 72, (1972), which rejected the common law
rule and adopted the position taken by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885. Id at -, 499 P.2d at
74. "A valid release of one tortfeasor from liability for a harm, given by the injured person, does
not discharge others liable for the same harm, unless it is agreed that is will discharge them."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885(l). Many jurisdictions have taken the approach that the intent of
the parties shall govern. See generally Weems v. Freeman, 234 Ga. 575, _, 216 S.E.2d 774, 775
(1975); Sanderson v Hughes, 526 S.W.2d 308 (Ct. App. 1975). This approach was questioned in
O'Bryan v. Peterson, 563 S.W.2d 732 (Ct. App. 1977), but the court found itself bound to follow
the rule of the Kentucky Supreme Court while expressing its disapproval and urging the Supreme
Court to review its decisions and find that a release of one tortfeasor is not a release of all. Id at
736. See also Rossum v. Jones, 97 N.J. Super. 382 235 A.2d 206, 210 (1967); Savelich Logging
Co. v. Preston Mill Co., 265 Or. 467, 509 P.2d 1179, 1184 (1973); Bartholomew v. McCartha, 255
S.C. 489, , 179 S.E.2d 912, 914 (1971); Armstreet v. Greer, 411 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Ct. App. Tex.
1967). Some jurisdictions follow the common law rule governing releases unless there is an ex-
press reservation to the contrary. See generally Cox v. Pearl Investment Co., 168 Colo. 67, 450
P.2d 60 (Colo. 1969); Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. 512 S.W.2d 886, 890 (Ct. App. 1974);
McCloskey v. Porter, 161 Mont. 307, _, 506 P.2d 845, 848 (1972); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 529, _, 285 N.Y.S.2d 462, 464 (1967). Other jurisdictions
have adopted the rule that a release of one tortfeasor does not release other joint tortfeasors.
Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969), where the court said that in their "opinion the rule
which will bring most clarity to this area of ambiguous and conflicting release rules is one under
which a release of one tortfeasor does not release other joint tortfeasors. ... Id at 893. See
4
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B. The Covenant Not to Sue or Execute
Due to the harsh effect a release had on a settling plaintiff, it was
necessary that some other means of settlement be devised. The result
was what is termed a covenant not to sue. As a response to the re-
lease,"1 the covenant not to sue is practically no different from the re-
lease, other than its effect on the plaintiff's right to proceed against
other joint tortfeasors.12 The theoretical difference is that while a re-
lease relinquishes all rights to a claim against another party, the cove-
nant not to sue retains those rights and grants a promise not to enforce
them. 13
The distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue has
been found to be artificial. 4 The current trend is to focus on the intent
also Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265 (1973); Witacke v. Presque Isle Bank, 68 Mich.
App. 599, -., 243 N.W.2d 907, 911 (1976); Thorton v. Charleston Area Medical Center, - W. Va.
-.. 213 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1975).
11. See Reese v. Cradit, 12 Ariz. App. 233, -., 469 P.2d 467 (1970). The court found that
"[c]ovenants of this type are resorted to in an effort to avoid pitfalls in the common law rule that
the release of one joint tort-feasor releases all." Id at _, 469 P.2d at 471. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 3, § 49.
12. "A covenant not to sue or not to execute is not considered a release of tort liability and
rights are thereby preserved against joint tortfeasors not a party to the covenant." Reese v. Cradit,
12 Ariz. App. 233, _ 469 P.2d 467, 471 (1970). See also Holve v. Draper, 95 Idaho 193, _, 505
P.2d 1265, 1268 (1973) (covenant not to sue does not release joint tortfeasors unless it is found to
be in full satisfaction of the claim); Cullen v. Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R., 211 Kan. 368,
__ 507 P.2d 353, 362 (1973) (a covenant not to sue does not release joint tortfeasors, however, it
does operate a pro tanto reduction against any judgment obtained against others). "Under Illinois
law a covenant not to sue does not have the same legal effect as a release, and has no effect on the
liability of other wrongdoers not parties to the covenant." Kravis v. Smith-Marine, Inc., 20 Il1.
App. 3d 483, -, 314 N.E.2d 577, 582 (1974). "Such a covenant is held not to release other
tortfeasors, even in the absence of any reservation of rights against them, unless it is found that
there has in fact been full satisfaction of the claim." W. PROSSER, supra note 3. § 49 at 303. "The
practice of executing a covenant not to sue rather than a release is in modern times resorted to in
order to avoid releasing all joint tortfeasors .. " Mead, supra note 4, at 368; "[S]ince plaintiffs
cause of action is not extinguished, he may proceed against others." Release To One Tort-Feasor,
supra note 4, at 1145. See also Joint Torfeasor, supra note 4, at 1415.
13. "A covenant not to sue contemplates a reservation of rights by the plaintiff while the
release does not." Lousberg, Actions Against Multole Torfeasors: Credits Against Verdicts, 55
ILL. B.J. 500, 502 (1967). See also Tort Feasors in Oklahoma, supra note 5, at 99. This purely
theoretical distinction is criticized in that it puts the focus on form rather than the intent of the
parties. "[A] covenant not to sue is merely an enforceable promise by the injured party not to
pursue his claim against the covenantee.... " Release to One Tort-Feasor, supra note 4, at 1145,
"A covenant not to sue, however, does not release any of the tortfeasors but is an agreement not to
enforce the cause of action or claim against one or more of them." Joint Torqfeasors, stfora note 4,
at 1415.
14. We agree with defendant that distinction between a "release" and a "covenant not to
sue" is entirely artificial. When one surrenders all means of enforcing his claim against
another and does this in settlement of a dispute and threatened litigation, he effectually
extinguishes the underlying right. Thereafter, if it is right at all, it is right without rem-
edy. We know that courts of highest authority have recognized the existence of such
"rights" in exceptional situations involving particularly matters of international adjust-
5
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of the parties, ignoring the form of the instrument, thereby only attach-
ing a label to the agreement once the intent has been discerned.15 By
focusing on the intent of the parties, and exalting substance over form,
the formal distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue has
become practically meaningless.16
ment and ofgovernmental credit. Absence of means of compulsion against the sovereign
may make judicial assertion that rights exist against it, without other remedy, an appro-
priate sanction in such cases and possibly in others. But for the ordinary run of private
rights and private litigation, the idea of right without remedy is hardly a working hy-
pothesis. Everyday law is predicated upon the courts' capacity to do something about
disputes. When one wholly surrenders his recourse to the courts in such matters, he
insulates his adversary against his claim as effectually as when in so many words he
releases him.
The distinction gains no strength from the conflict which exists concerning what is a
release and what is a covenant not to sue. Some courts regard the matter as one of
intention to be gathered from the whole instrument. Giving lip service to the rule, they
avoid its effects when the purpose to reserve rights against the wrongdoers not released
can be found, as generally it may be. Specific terms of release give way before a clause
expressly reserving such rights or other indication of like intent. In this view the present
instrument would be merely a covenant not to sue.
Other courts adhering to the distinction refuse to permit such a clause to overcome
express words of release and allow escape only when the formula is limited to cove-
nanting not to sue. To the extent that they decline to give effect to the clause they disre-
gard the parties' intention, as would a court refusing entirely to recognize the distinction.
In this view the agreement now in question would be a release and would discharge
defendant by operation of law.
In determining the character as well as the effect of such an agreement, we are
unwilling to concede so much potency to mere verbalism. The matter does not require
the formalism of conveyancing. Whether words of "release" or of "covenant" are used,
the effect should be the same. Wide acceptance of the distinction, notwithstanding its
want of substance, and the decisions that in applying it intention should control, point
the way to reexamination of the rule and its foundations.
McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (footnotes omitted). "This is probably
the worst of all fictions for how can we say that the surrender of right to sue does not release the
person to whom it is given." [sic] O'Bryan v. Peterson, 563 S.W.2d 732, 735 (Ct. App. 1977). The
distinction between a release and covenant not to sue is a "hypertechnical distinction." Holve v.
Draper, 505 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Idaho 1973). "A covenant not to sue is not a release, but it is to be
distinguished from a release, and the distinction, although technical or artificial is clear." 76
C.J.S. Release § 3 at 630 (footnotes omitted). "[Tihe distinction between a covenant not to sue
and a release is entirely artificial." Release To One Tort-Feasor, supra note 4, at 1145. "This
distinction has been criticized as being nebulous and artificial." Torifeasors in Oklahoma, supra
note 5, at 97.
15. "Whether an instrument is to be construed to be a covenant not to sue depends upon the
language used, the substance of the agreement, and the intention of the parties." Edgar County
Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hosp. Inc., 10 Ill. App. 3d 465, _, 294 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1973). "The
underlying rationale is that this construction would thereby give force and effect to the intention
of the parties to the instrument." Plath v. Justus, 28 N.Y.2d 16, 19, 319 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435, 268
N.E.2d 117, 118 (1971). "The correct rule adopted by this court is that the distinction between a
covenant not to sue and a release will be preserved according to the intention of the parties."
Christianson v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., 7 Wash. App. 309, _, 499 P.2d 72, 74 (1972), citing Mills
v. Inter Island, 68 Wash. 2d 820, __, 416 P.2d 115, 121 (1966). "A covenant not to sue, while
technically not a release, has a similiar effect. Mead, supra note 4, at 368. Tort Feasors in
Oklahoma, supra note 5, at 97.
16. "The rule that the reservation of a right shows the intention of the parties not to release
the non-settling defendant and that such a document should be considered a covenant not to sue
6
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A mode of settlement closely related to the covenant not to sue is
the covenant not to execute. This is a promise given by the plaintiff
that he will not execute upon any judgment rendered against the set-
tling defendant. Like the covenant not to sue, this is not a surrender of
the right to execute on the judgment but rather is a promise not to
enforce that right. The covenant not to execute provides the plaintiff
greater flexibility than the covenant not to sue because it allows him to
settle at a later time.
17
C. The Loan Receiot
The loan receipt agreement had its origin in the context of com-
mon carriers and shippers and the attempts of each to shift liability for
shipping losses to the other.'8 Under this agreement, the insurance
company makes a loan to the insured-shipper prior to any adjudication
of liability. If it subsequently is determined that the common carrier
has some liability for loss to the shipper, then the amount of damages
recovered by the plaintiff-shipper is reimbursed to the insurance com-
pany to the extent of the loan or as stipulated by the agreement.' 9
rather than an absolute release are numerous." Cox v. Pearl Investment Co., 168 Colo. 67, -, 450
P.2d 60, 63 (1969). "[I]nstruments in the form of releases will be construed as 'covenants not to
sue' in order to carry out the intention of the parties." Lows v. Warfield, 149 Ind. App. 569, -,
274 N.E.2d 553, 556-57 (1971). "A covenant not to sue will be treated as a release of all tort-
feasors if reasonably compensatory consideration has been paid by one or more tort-feasors to the
plaintiff." Monjay v. Evergreen School Dist., 13 Wash. App. 654, -, 537 P.2d 825, 828 (1975).
"An instrument though nominally a release, will be construed as a covenant not to sue if it
reserves rights against any remaining tortfeasor." Lousberg, Actions Against Multiple Tortfeasors:
Credits Against Verdicts, 55 ILL. B.J. 500, 503 (1967). See also UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, where a release and covenant not to sue receive identical treatment rela-
tive to their effect on contribution.
17. A covenant not to execute "is generally used where plaintiff has obtained a joint and
several judgment. However, the covenant not to execute has also been used where judgment has
not yet been obtained in an action pending against the defendant." Note, Loan Agreements as
Settlement Devices-Affirmative Duty to Disclose Loan Agreement to the Court and to the Remain-
ing Defendants, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 792, 795 (1976).
18. See Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Co., 248 U.S. 139 (1918). Seegenerally Annot.,
13 A.L.R.3d 42, 48-49 (1967).
19. An example of the typical loan receipt agreement is found in McKay, Loan Agreenent: A
Settlement Device That Deserves Close Scrutiny, 10 VAL. L. REv. 231, 231 (1976).
For instance, Ray is insured by the Safety Insurance Company on all shipments of
sugar cane made in the course of Ray's commercial enterprise. Tarry Shippers is in the
business of shipping cargoes of sugar cane. Unfortunately, Tarry Shippers loses the
sugar cane which was shipped by Ray. In order to fulfill its contractual obligation to
indemnify, Safety Insurance Company enters into a loan receipt agreement with Ray.
The agreement provides the following: (I) The amount turned over to Ray, the insured,
is received as a loan. (2) It is repayable only in the event and to the extent of a recovery
by the insured from Tarry Shippers or other third persons on account of the loss de-
scribed therein. (3) The insured's claim against third persons who may be liable for the
loss is pledged as security for such repayment. (4) Ray, the insured, shall institute an
7
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Arrangements of this type were indorsed by the United States
Supreme Court in Luckenbach v. W.J McCahan Sugar Refining Co.2"
In approving the loan receipt agreement, the Court said: "It is credita-
ble to the ingenuity of business men that an arrangement should have
been devised which is consonant both with the needs of commerce and
the demands of justice."'"
While this rationale may stand in the business world, the loan re-
ceipt agreement has expanded beyond that realm. Its use has infil-
trated personal injury cases involving multiple defendants.22 In
personal injury cases, the loan receipt agreement operates by one or
more, but not all, of the defendants loaning a specified amount of
money to the plaintiff prior to the lawsuit. If the plaintiff is subse-
quently successful against the defendant(s) not entering the agreement,
he promises to reimburse the settling defendant(s) to the extent of his
loan. If liability is found to lie only with the settling defendant(s), then
his loan is not repaid and the plaintiff promises not to execute on the
judgment. By executing the loan receipt agreement, the plaintiffs re-
covery is no longer contingent on the success of his lawsuit.
Loan receipt agreements in the area of joint tortfeasors have been
both upheld23 and struck down.24 The position supported by most
action in his own name against Tarry Shippers and such third persons or appoint the
insurer, Safety Insurance Company, his attorney, with irrevocable power to prosecute or
settle such an action in the insured's name and to execute any documents necessary to
effectuate the agreement. In any event, the action against Tarry Shippers is to be under
the insurer's exclusive control, direction, and expense. (5) Ray, the insured, warrants,
that he is the person entitled to the payment and that he has not and will not settle with
or release Tarry Shippers or anyone responsible for the loss without the consent of the
insurer, Safety Insurance Company. This example sets forth the typical situation from
which these agreements arose and upon which they have been held valid.
Id The author adds that use of the word loan in this type of agreement is a fiction. Id at 236.
20. 248 U.S. 139 (1918).
21. Id at 149.
22. "Loan receipts are quite common between insurer and insured. Their use stems from the
early case of Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Ref. Co. . . .Since then their use has been
greatly extended by insurance carriers but rarely have they been used between joint tortfeasors."
Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb. 858, __, 136 N.W.2d 194, 201 (1965) (questioning the extension of
the loan receipt agreement to cases involving joint tortfeasors). Recognizing that the rationale
may not hold, one commentator finds that
"[i]t is absolutely crucial to distinguish between the two main contexts in which loan
agreements appear: (I) the. . . traditional plaintiff-insured and plaintiff's insurer con-
text and (2) the more recent plaintiff-codefendant context. . . .[I]n the former there are
several positive reasons in favor of loan agreements while in the latter several negative
reasons exist for prohibition of loan receipt agreements."
McCay, supra note 19, at 232. See generally, Scoby, Loan Receipts and Guaranty Agreements, 10
FORUM 1300 (1975).
23. Thus in considering the efficacy of loan receipts in Illinois, we contemplate those
situations in which a concurrent tortfeasor, perhaps otherwise unable to obtain indem-
nity from his joint tortfeasor, may escape liability and judgment by loaning funds to a
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commentators is to put to an end the use of loan receipt agreements in
cases involving joint tortfeasors as multiple defendants,25 thus limiting
the avenues of settlement methods open to plaintiffs.
III. THE HISTORY OF MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS
Mary Carter agreements, and the problems they present, have
been addressed by many jurisdictions. While the treatment afforded
them varies, cases from four jurisdictions (Florida, Texas, Arizona and
plaintiff. Thus framed the question becomes whether our policy of denying contribution
between joint tortfeasors outweighs the considerations favoring private settlement of
lawsuits. We think it does not.
Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356,._., 303 N.E.2d 382, 386 (1973). "The
willingness of one joint tort-feasor to place a substantial sum of money at the disposal of the
damaged party with a possibility of no recoupment is certainly to be encouraged." American
Transp. Co. v. Central Ind. R.R., 255 Ind. 319, __, 264 N.E.2d 64, 67 (1970). See also Northern
Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Otis, 145 Ind. App. 159, -, 250 N.E.2d 378, 393 (1969) (upholding a loan
receipt agreement finding that it neither violated the rule against contribution among tortfeasors
nor was it an assignment of a cause of action); Cullen v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 211
Kan. 368, _, 507 P.2d 353, 360 (1973) (found loan receipt agreement was valid and did not violate
public policy by constituting champerty or maintenance); Bivens v. Charlie's Hobby Shop, 500
S.W.2d 597 (Ct. App. Ky. 1973); Klotz v. Lee, 36 N.J. Super. 6, 114 A.2d 746 (1955). Grillo v.
Burkes Point Co., 275 Or. 421, -, 551 P.2d 449, 453 (1976). See also Scoby, supra note 22, where
the author finds three reasons advanced in support of loan receipt agreements: 1) they tend to
encourage settlement; 2) they make funds readily available to plaintiff; 3) they tend to simplify
multi-party litigation. The author answers these reasons by saying that loan receipts do not actu-
ally encourage settlement because the plaintiff is obligated to continue litigation. While human in
terms of putting the plaintiff in funds the real question is whether he is entitled to those funds.
Finally, the only time multi-party litigation will be simplified is in that limited situation in which
the tortfeasor would have to show he was only passively or secondarily liable in order to claim
indemnification. Id at 1313-15.
24. Tober v. Hampton, 178 Neb. 858, -, 136 N.W.2d 194, 207 (1965) (disallowed the use of
the agreement in the context ofjoint tortfeasors because the real party in interest was not in the
suit); Monjay v. Evergreen School Dist., 13 Wash. App. 654, -, 537 P.2d 825, 829-830 (1975)
(found that the agreement violated public policy of pro-tanto reduction of judgment against the
remaining tortfeasors; that had it a potentially coercive effect; and that it contained strong over-
tones of champerty).
25. Lageson, supra note 2, at 105. While not assuming a position pro or con as to the validity
of a loan receipt agreement, Lageson suggests an interesting approach. Namely, the terms of the
agreement should be submitted to the jury as one element to consider in determining and appor-
tioning damages. Id This approach has also been suggested as a method of dealing with Mary
Carter agreements. See notes 78-83 infra and accompanying text. It has been opined that loan
receipt agreements are a violation of ethics, contrary to public policy, a circumvention of the rule
prohibiting contribution or indemnity between cotortfeasors, do not present the real party in inter-
est, act as an assignment of a claim, are champertous, and prejudicial to the nonagreeing defend-
ant. McKay, supra note 19, at 246-56.
At a time when the trend of the law is toward candor, disclosure and efforts to make
trials reflect substance and reality rather than an exercise in guile and form for the
amusement of lawyers, endorsement of use of the loan receipt agreement is regression.
Trial of a lawsuit should not be encouraged to degenerate into a battle of clever phrase-
making and disguised postures; use of the loan receipt is a step in that direction for no
demonstrable need.
Scoby, supra note 22, at 1316.
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Nevada) are representative and reflect the extreme approaches being
taken.
Mary Carter agreements had their genesis in the Florida case of
Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co.26 and the phrase was coined in Maule
Industries, Inc. v. Roundtree.27 Booth involved an automobile accident
between the plaintiff and three truck drivers, all named as defendants.
Two of the trucks belonged to the Mary Carter Paint Company. Prior
to the trial, attorneys for the plaintiff entered into a settlement agree-
ment with the third truck driver. The agreement established a maxi-
mum liability to which this driver could be subjected. Additionally, he
would not have to pay any damages if the amount of recovery against
the drivers of the trucks belonging to the Mary Carter Paint Company
equaled or exceeded his maximum liability.28 The court gave the
26. 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
27. 264 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), remanded, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973) (case
was remanded in light of Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973), dealing with the extent of the
agreement's admissibility).
28. The following is the agreement used in Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co.
An agreement between William T. Keen of the firm of Shackleford, Farrior, Stall-
ings, Glos & Evans, as counsel of record for the defendants, B.C. Willoughby and Harry
Lee Sutton, and Mark R. Hawes, of the firm of Hawes and Hadden, counsel of record for
the plaintiff, J.D. Booth, provides:
"I. That the maximum liability, exposure of financial contribution of the defend-
ants, B.C. Willoughby and Harry Lee Sutton, shall be $12,500.00."
The agreement further provides:
Second, that in the event of a joint verdict against Willoughby and the Mary Carter
Paint Company exceeding $37,500.00, that the plaintiff will satisfy said judgment against
Mary Carter Paint Company entirely, with no contribution from Willoughby and Sut-
ton. Provided, however, that if the Mary Carter Paint Company is not financially re-
sponsible to the extent of $37,500.00, the defendant Willoughby will contribute an
amount of money between Mary Carter Paint Company's actual responsibility and the
figure of $37,500.00, but not to exceed $12,500.00.
Third, Willoughby and Sutton agreed that in the event of a verdict for all the de-
fendants, they would pay the plaintiff $12,500.00; and in the event of a verdict against
Mary Carter Paint Company less than $37,500.00, that Willoughby and Sutton would
contribute the sum of $12,500.00.
Fourth, Willoughby and Sutton shall continue as active defendants in the active
defense of said litigation until all questions of liability and damages are resolved be-
tween the plaintiff and the other defendants.
Fifth, that should the conditions laid down in the agreement result in any financial
responsibility on the part of Willoughby and Sutton, they will pay the plaintiff when five
days after the questions of liability and damages between the plaintiff and the other
defendants are settled or concluded.
In paragraph 6 we again find the provision that the financial responsibility, exposure
of liability of Willoughby and Sutton shall not exceed the sum of $12,500.00.
Seventh, it is stated:
"It is the intention of the parties hereto that this agreement shall be construed as a
conditional agreement between them as to financial responsibility only, and that it shall
in no wise constitute, or be construed to constitute, a release, settlement, admission of
liability, or otherwise, and shall have no effect upon the trial of this case as to liability or
extent of damages, nor shall said agreement be revealed to the jury trying said case."
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agreement a cursory treatment and concluded that "the instrument is
what it purports to be, an agreement that would limit the liability of
defendants. . . to pay a sum not exceeding $12,500 and which would
guarantee the plaintiff the sum of $12,500 if any verdict was secured for
less than $37,500.129
Four basic elements emerge from Booth which distinguish Mary
Carter agreements from other types of settlement agreements. First,
the settling defendant agrees to remain in the action. Second, the
agreement is kept secret. Third, the plaintiff is guaranteed a certain
amount of damages regardless of the success of his lawsuit. Fourth, the
settling defendant has the chance of eventually paying no damages.30
Eighth, it was agreed that the contents of this agreement would be furnished to no
one, unless so ordered by the court, and
Ninth, that the terms and conditions specified in the agreement, which are depen-
dent upon a jury verdict, should be equally applicable to and binding on the parties in
the event plaintiff Booth amicably settles the issues of liability and damages with Mary
Carter Paint Company.
202 So. 2d at 10.
29. 202 So. 2d at 11. The court's cursory treatment might be explained by the fact that the
defendant did not complain of the agreement's existence, but rather claimed that he should have a
pro tanto reduction of his damages. Id at 8.
30. Id. A Mary Carter agreement has been defined as "a contract by which one codefendant
secretly agrees with the plaintiff that, if such defendant will proceed to defend himself in court, his
own maximum liability will be diminished proportionately by increasing the liability of the other
codefendants. Secrecy is the essence of such an arrangement .. " Bedord School Dist. v. Caron
Const. Co., 116 N.H. 800, _ 367 A.2d 1051, 1053 (1976) (citing Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385,
387 (Fla. 1973)).
The typical Mary Carter agreement generally embodies four principal collusive fea-
tures:
(1) Secrecy, in that both the plaintiff and the contracting defendant or defendants
agree to keep the "agreement" secret and confidential;
(2) The contracting defendant or defendants agree to remain as party defendants
in the action, and they also become active proponents of the plaintif's case;
(3) The contracting defendant or defendants "guarantee" to the plaintiff a specific
sum of money in the event that the plaintiffloses the case or in the event that the plaintiff
recovers less than that specific sum of money; and
(4) The contracting defendant or defendants partake of an interest in the outcome
of the litigation.
Friedman, The Expected Demise of "Mary Carter:" She Never Was Well, 633 Ins. L.J.
602, 609-10 (1975). It has been stated that there are three basic elements of a "Mary
Carter" agreement: (1) The defendants entering the agreement agree to remain parties to
the law suit; (2) all parties agree to keep the agreement secret; and (3) the defendants
entering the agreement guarantee that the plaintiff will receive a given sum, and the
plaintiff agrees that this guarantee will be enforced only to the extent the plaintiff fails,
after appropriate efforts, to recover the guaranteed sum from the other potential defend-
ants.
Michael, "Mary Carter"Agreements in Illinois, 64 ILL. B.J. 514, 516 (1976). See also Comment,
The Mary Carter Agreement-Solving the Problems of Collusive Settlements in Joint Tort Actions,
47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Problems ofCollusive Settlements].
A fifth element which might be added is that the possibility of the settling defendant having
to pay no damages is contingent on the plaintiffs success. Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes, 49 OKLA. B.J.
2157 (1978). It appears that a number of the features which distinguish a Mary Carter may also be
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In Maule Industries, the Florida Supreme Court was asked to de-
clare Mary Carter agreements void as against public policy. The court
refused to do so but, in an apparent attempt to buffer the effects of
Booth said, "we neither condone nor condemn such agreements generi-
cally." 3
1
It was not until Ward v. Ochoa32 that the loose language and im-
plications of Booth were corralled. In Ward, the court expressly
rejected Booth and decided that when an agreement exists which de-
creases the settling defendant's liability by increasing the other defend-
ant's liability, the agreement must be admitted into evidence at the
request of the non-settling defendants. The court further held that the
non-settling defendants may move for severance due to possible
prejudice and the judge should exercise his discretion in ruling on this
motion.33
GeneralMotors Corp. v. Simmons34 is the leading Texas case deal-
ing with Mary Carter agreements. In Simmons, the plaintiff was in-
volved in an automobile accident and was injured when the window in
his automobile shattered. Simmons sued General Motors, Feld Truck
Leasing Corporation, the owner of the other vehicle, and the driver.
Prior to the trial, Simmons entered into a Mary Carter agreement with
Feld and the driver.35 Judgment was entered in favor of Simmons.
found in other forms of settlement. Any settlement agreement may be kept secret and, under a
covenant not to sue, the plaintiff is guaranteed a certain amount of damages regardless of the
success of his lawsuit. The pivotal point of distinction would seem to be the incentive the settling
defendant has for placing liability on the non-settling defendant with the possibility that he will
have to pay no damages. "This must be distinguished from three other types of pretrial agree-
ments in which this feature is not present: (1) a release; (2) a covenantnot to sue; and (3) agree-
ments in which the participating defendants limit their liability to a fixed amount, regardless of
the outcome of the trial or the amount ofjudgment." Note, "Mary Carter"Limitation On Liability
4greements Between Adversary Parties: .4 Painted Lady is Exposed, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 988, 989
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Limitation on Liability Agreements].
31. 264 So. 2d at 447. See also Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971), where the
court found that the Mary Carter Agreement contravened public policy, was void, and unenforce-
able. Id at 351-53.
32. 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
33. Id at 388. This is currently the state of the law in Florida, the birthplace of Mary Carter
agreements. This is a rather liberal approach and recent Florida decisions have begun nurturing
the use of Mary Carter agreements. See, e.g., Kuhns v. Fenton, 288 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1973); Frier's,
Inc. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 355 So. 2d 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); AtI. Ambulance &
Convalescent Serv. v. Asbury, 330 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); General Portland Land
Div. Co. v. Stevens, 291 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
34. 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977).
35. In Simmons, plaintiff and defendant executed an agreement whereby settling defendant
would pay plaintiff a certain sum prior to trial and, at the same time, remain a defendant in the
lawsuit. In return, the plaintiff promised not to execute against the settling defendant and pay 50%
12
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General Motors appealed, claiming error by the trial court in failing to
admit the agreement into evidence.
The Texas Supreme Court set out the traditional rule preventing
disclosure of settlements, relying on the public policy of encouraging
settlement.36 But the court distinguished the agreement in Simmons
from traditional settlement agreements. Because the defendant re-
mained in the lawsuit and acquired a financial interest in the outcome,
the court concluded that the policy behind prohibiting admission of
settlement agreements into evidence did not apply in this situation.
Finding that the financial interests of the parties and their adverse posi-
tions were proper areas of inquiry, the court ruled that the settlement
agreement should be admitted into evidence.37
Apparently the two factors used by the court in Simmons to justify
admission of the agreement are pivotal. In Miller v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co.,38 the Texas Supreme Court distinguished Simmons and
ruled that evidence of a settlement agreement may be excluded where
of every dollar up to $200.00 which was collected from the non-settling defendant, to the settling
defendant. Id at 857.
36. "[A] settlement agreement is not admissible as an admission against interest or otherwise,
because to admit such agreements would frustrate the policy favoring the settlement of lawsuits."
McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex. 1968).
Where two parties are engaged in a lawsuit arising out of a transaction which in-
volved other persons, the fact that one party made a compromise with a third person
cannot generally be received in evidence as an admission of the party's liability. Thus, in
a negligence action evidence that the defendant has paid third persons on claims arising
from the same transaction or incident as that from which the plaintiffs claim arose is
generally held not admissible as an admission of liability.
Although having a slight bearing upon the injured person's credibility, evidence of a
compromise between him and one of several tortfeasors is properly excluded over the
objections of another tortfeasor sought to be held liable for the injuries, since the evi-
dence would have informed the jury that one of the defendants had admitted liability
and might also have been used as a basis for an argument that the injured person had
accepted the amount of the settlement as fair compensation for his injuries.
29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 632 (1967).
37. The court was able to admit the agreement by finding that, in the course of a proper cross
examination, it could be used. The court determined that there was a strong policy behind estab-
lishing a party's interest in a suit. Viewing this as analogous to insurance cases, the court found
this to be an exception to the general rule prohibiting admission of settlement agreements.
[Tihere is another strong policy in Texas that one may not develop testimony that a
party's loss was covered by insurance since that fact is not considered material to the
issue of liability. . . . When, however, as in another case, an agent of an insurance com-
pany that was the real party at interest took the witness stand under the semblance of
being a disinterested witness to testify against the opposing party, his connection with the
insurer was not exempt from cross-examination.
558 S.W.2d at 858. The court then continued by laying down the rule "that interest, bias, or
motive on the part of a witness may be elicited on cross-examination even though it incidentally
discloses that the defendant is protected by insurance." Id Under the court's reasoning the Mary
Carter agreement would be analogous to the insurance agreement.
38. 568 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1977).
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the settling defendant, even though he remained in the law suit, did not
acquire a financial interest in the plaintiff's case.39 A recent limitation
on Simmons may be found in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales.4° In Gon-
zales, the court allowed admission of an agreement they identified as a
Mary Carter, but only to show bias and attack the credibility of wit-
nesses.41 The approach taken by Texas, allowing Mary Carter agree-
ments but requiring that they be admitted into evidence under certain
circumstances and for a limited purpose, is common to other jurisdic-
tions.42
City of Glendale v. Bradshaw,4s a case decided by the Arizona
Court of Appeals, involved a Mary Carter agreement minus one impor-
tant element found in Booth. In Bradshaw, the plaintiff was a passen-
ger in a car involved in a one car accident. The car struck a mound of
dirt when the road on which it was traveling came to an end. The car
was hurled into the air coming to rest at some distance. Plaintiff
brought suit against the driver of the vehicle for her negligent operation
and the City of Glendale for failing to properly maintain a warning
sign indicating that the road ended. Prior to trial, the plaintiff entered
into a Mary Carter agreement with the driver of the vehicle. At trial,
the City of Glendale argued that, in light of the Mary Carter agree-
ment, the court should either declare a mistrial or dismiss the action
against the driver. The trial court overruled both motions and was af-
firmed on appeal.
The element missing in Bradshaw and pivotal to the court's deci-
sion, was secrecy. The agreement had the other elements of a Mary
Carter, and, had it contained the element of secrecy, the agreement
39. In General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1977), we held that it
was reversible error to exclude evidence of a "Mary Carter" settlement agreement
whereby the settling defendant acquired a direct financial interest in plaintiffs lawsuit.
In so holding, we distinguished that type of settlement agreement from an ordinary set-
tlement agreement which is properly excluded from the jury. The settlement agreement
entered into here was not a "Mary Carter" agreement because Jenkins [settling defend-
ant] did not acquire a financial interest in Miller's [plaintiff] recovery against Bock [non-
settling defendant].
Id at 652.
40. 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
41. Id at 805. The settling defendant attempted to distinguish this case from Simmons by
alleging that since his insurer was paying the guarantee he had no financial interest. The court did
not accept this argument finding that the "payment was made on behalf of [the settling defendant],
and therefore, [the insurer] and [the settling defendant] should stand in the same shoes." Id
42. See notes 64-75 infra and accompanying text.
43. 16 Ariz. App. 348, 493 P.2d 515 (1972).
19791
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would have been voided and found to involve unethical conduct. 44
Recognizing that there was some chance for collusiveness and a likeli-
hood that the jury would be presented with a distorted view of the law-
suit, the court nonetheless upheld the agreement on the legal principal
"that a defendant may choose to defend in the manner of his choice." 45
The court seemed to find solace in the fact that the plaintiff could have
chosen to execute solely against the non-settling defendant even with-
out the agreement.46 Careful not to permit all types of agreements, the
court concluded by saying that "we. . .do not voice our unqualified
approval of the agreement. . . 4.
In City of Tucson v. Gallagher,48 the Supreme Court of Arizona
gave further approval to Mary Carter agreements. The court reasoned
that even present the agreement, the settling defendant's motive was
identical: first, to argue that he in no way caused the injury and sec-
ond, to attempt to place all liability on the non-settling defendant.
While this may be superficially true, absent the agreement a difference
in motive is quite possible. Arguably, the defendant in response to the
plaintiff's case would assume a defensive posture, attempting to show
no liability. With the agreement being present, there is no need for the
defendant to assume this posture. His liability to the plaintiff has been
decided; the only remaining question is that of degree. Present the
agreement, the settling defendant assumes an offensive position di-
rected towards the non-settling defendant. Rather than showing that
"he did not do it," the settling defendant would be showing "the other
44. Dealing with two similar agreements that both involved secrecy, the Ethics Committee of
the State Bar of Arizona found them to be improper. The court then found that:
[W]hile the committee concluded that both of these agreements were improper, this
Court cannot overlook the fact that an essential part of each agreement was that counsel
for the third defendant would not be made aware of these agreements prior to the ren-
dering of a verdict. This factor alone substantially reduces the recognition which this
Court will afford to the ethics opinion when its facts and holding are viewed in the light
of the circumstances surrounding the covenant not to execute m the case at bar. I he
agreement in our case was made known to defense counsel prior to the beginning of the
trial. . . .Inasmuch as the City's counsel was aware of the subject covenant prior to trial
and because the plaintiff could have chosen to execute against only the City even in the
absence of a covenant not to execute, it is the holding of this Court that the trial court's
rulings... were correct and are affirmed.
Id at 522-23.
45. 16 Ariz. App. at -, 493 P.2d at 523. This would appear to be a rather hollow argument.
Certainly the court would not sanction perjury because the defendant may defend himself in any
manner he chooses.
46. Id While this may be true, the fact remains that in the absence of the agreement, the
plaintiff had a choice as to which defendant he would execute against. With the agreement, no
such choice existed.
47. Id
48. 108 Ariz. 140, 493 P.2d 1197 (1972).
[Vol. 14:744
15
May: Mary Carter Agreements: A Viable Means of Settlement
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
]MAR Y CARTER A GREEMENTS
defendant did do it." The settling defendant would have no concern
with his liability. His focus shifts to convincing the jury that the dam-
ages recoverable against the defendants jointly are of such an amount
that under the agreement he would be absolved of all responsibility for
the judgment.4 9
Hemet Dodge v. Gryder5 ° gave further approval to Mary Carter
agreements, although recognizing that the settling defendant may be
severed from the lawsuit at the discretion of the trial judge. In Hemet
Dodge, the court recognized that this type of agreement allows a plain-
tiff to be assured of some recovery without the disadvantage of having
to try a case without the presence of the settling defendant. 5 The pres-
ent state of the law in Arizona relating to Mary Carter agreements is
found in Sequoia Manufacturing Co. v. Halec Construction Co. 52 There,
the Arizona Court of Appeals retreated from the position asserted in
Gallagher. The court found that an agreement which allows a settling
defendant to improve his financial position if a verdict for a certain
amount is returned against a non-settling defendant, should be admit-
ted into evidence at the discretion of the trial judge. 3 The court found
no fraud, collusion, or change in trial strategy when such an agreement
is present. It did, however, believe that there may exist some uninten-
tional prejudice towards the non-settling defendant and as a result,
hinged admission of the agreement upon the discretion of the trial
judge rather than making it one of absolute right.
An extreme approach to Mary Carter agreements, taking the posi-
tion that such agreements are void and unenforceable as against public
policy, was adopted by Nevada in Lum v. Stinnett. 4 This case in-
volved a malpractice suit instituted by the plaintiff against three physi-
cians. Upon sustaining a back injury, the plaintiff went to a hospital
emergency room to have the injury treated. There he was treated by
Dr. Greene, the attending physician, in consultation by phone with Dr.
Romeo, the plaintiff's family physician. X-rays were taken of the
plaintiff's back and were read by Dr. Lum. Plaintiff alleged that all
49. In the typical Mary Carter agreement, the settling defendant's damages are inversely pro-
portional to the amount of the award given by the jury. See note 30 supra.
50. 23 Ariz. App. 523, 534 P.2d 454 (1975).
51. Id at _, 534 P.2d at 461.
52. 117 Ariz. App. 11, 570 P.2d 782 (1977).
53. Id at_, 570 P.2d at 795. The reason for leaving the decision in the discretion of the trial
judge is that, at times, the agreement may prejudice the non-settling defendant. See note 79 supra
and accompanying text.
54. 87 Nev. 42, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
1979]
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three doctors were negligent in failing to detect and treat a compression
factor in his spine.
Defendants Greene and Romeo negotiated a Mary Carter agree-
ment with the plaintiff." During trial, the settling defendants were, on
their own motion, dismissed from the lawsuit. The non-settling de-
fendant then moved to have the suit dismissed. This motion was de-
nied. A verdict was returned against the remaining non-settling
defendant. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded, reinstating the cause of action against the two dismissed de-
fendants. The court, in "[c]onsidering the propriety of certain
'settlement agreements' calling for defense counsel to participate in liti-
gation when they were actually interested in furthering the plaintiff's
cause," 6 found them to be champertous and in contravention of poli-
cies behind the Canons of Professional Conduct.5 7 Contrary to the po-
55. The court found the agreement to be as follows:
(1) if the jury awarded nothing or less than $20,000, the insurance carriers for
Greene and Romeo were to pay the sum necessary to bring recovery to $20,000; (2) if the
verdict exceeded $20,000, respondent would not execute against Greene and Romeo; and
(3) respondent would not oppose a motion for directed verdict in favor of Greene and
Romeo.
Id at _ 488 P.2d at 348.
The court then continued and found that
[Mielded into the proposal were at least these self-serving recitals: (a) appellant's
insurance carrier had taken an "irresponsible position"; (b) this was why respondent
would deal separately concerning Greene and Romero; (c) respondent's counsel believed
Greene and Romero negligent; (d) nonetheless, they "recognize[d] that the greater share
of responsibility is upon Dr. Lum," and believed him 80% to blame; (e) respondent's
damages were approximately $100,000; (f) accordingly, respondent was willing to settle
concerning Greene and Romero for $20,000; (g) a smaller verdict was no more than a
"remote possibility."
Id at -, 488 P.2d at 348 n.l.
56. Id at __, 488 P.2d at 351.
57. Id (relying on conclusions of the Arizona State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional
Conduct). The manner in which the trial proceeded was very unusual and is illustrative of the
effects of a Mary Carter agreement. The court found that
while Romeo seemed the prime target of respondent's Complaint, respondent's counsel
focused on appellant in his opening statement to the jury, displaying apparent candor
regarding Greene and Romeo. Greene's counsel then announced he would reserve his
opening statement; thus, appellant's counsel could do the same, or hazard being left no
way to meet opening statements made later by counsel for the "co-defendants."
Thereafter, though now furthering the interests of Greene, Romeo, and their insur-
ance carriers, respondent's counsel called Greene as an "adverse party," and then op-
posed full cross-examination by appellant's counsel on the ground his own interrogation
was "cross-examination"; he defeated an objection that he was leading Romeo by con-
tending Romeo was an "adverse witness," and led him at will. when respondent's coun-
sel omitted to ask respondent's former employer if respondent had received "tips" as
well as wages, Greene's counsel went into this item of special damage on "cross-exami-
nation," in a notable departure from his usual nonchalance. In contrast to the placid
role played by counsel for appellant's "co-defendants," his own counsel's efforts must
have suggested only appellant had cause for concern. This inference can only have been
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sition assumed by the Florida Supreme Court that admission of the
agreement into evidence is a panacea for Mary Carter agreements, the
Nevada Supreme Court in Lum expressly rejected the argument of the
settling defendants that disclosure of the agreement and its admission
into evidence are sufficient safeguards for the non-settling defendants.
Responding to the disclosure argument, the court said, "[i]t is no an-
swer to appellant that he was not stabbed in the back. If his hands
were tied, it matters little that he could see the blow coming.
58
The cases summarized above do not comprise an exhaustive sur-
vey of all cases dealing with Mary Carter agreements.59 They do, how-
ever, provide a representative overview of the current state of the law
as it relates to this form of settlement.
IV. RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS
A. Void as Against Public Policy
Treating Mary Carter agreements as being void and unenforceable
strengthened when, at the close of respondent's case, the court granted 41(b) motions for
dismissal of Greene and Romeo, without opposition by respondent's counsel, but over
appellant's objection that he would be prejudiced if not similarly dismissed. Appellant's
41(b) motion for dismissal was denied.
Id at _, 488 P.2d at 348-49. In conclusion, the court found that "[i]t is sufficient to see from the
record as we do, that such irregularities so warped presentation of the case as to deny a fair
trial. ... Id at __ 488 P.2d at 353. See also Settlement Devices, supra note 2, where the author
found "[a]s to the issue of whether [an agreeing defendant] may be called as an adverse party
witness, it has been held that he may be cross-examined by leading questions by both the plaintiff
and the non-settling defendant." Id at 777. "Mary Carter Agreements distort the normal rela-
tionships between the plaintiff and defendants in multiparty tort litigation. The result is a nonad-
versary, collusive proceeding which unfairly prejudices the nonagreeing defendants right to a fair
trial." Problems of Collusive Settlements, supra, note 30, at 1398-99. It has been suggested by one
commentator that allowing Mary Carter agreements is an "unconstitutional denial of dueprocess
oflaw, unequal treatment be/ore the law, and a deprivation of the right to afair trial .. " Freed-
man, supra note 30, at 619. That author finds "that the mere judicial act of the state in permitting
the enforceability of such Mary Carter agreements constitutes sufficient state action in violation of
the fourteenth Amendment" to find a constitutional violation. Id But c' Problems of Collusive
Settlements, supra note 30, where the author finds "[a] Mary Carter Agreement is clearly a private
agreement between the plaintiff and agreeing defendants." Id at 1399 n.3 1. Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), were cited as situations where
private agreements judicially supported were found to constitute state action. However, the au-
thor found that in "Mary Carter Agreements the judicial role is passive and the parties 'discrimi-
nating' against the nonagreeing defendant are not being compelled by the court to do so against
their will. . . . Accepting this interpretation of Shelley and Barrows, it follows that Mary Carter
Agreements do not involve state action." Id.
58. 87 Nev. at _ 488 P.2d at 352.
59. See Mustang Equip. Co. v. Welch, 115 Ariz. 206, 564 P.2d 895 (1977); Swanson v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 349 So. 2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Bedford School Dist. v.
Caron Const. Co., 116 N.H. 800, 367 A.2d 1051 (1976); Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., - Ind. App. -, 355
N.E.2d 253 (1976); Brillo v. Burkes Paint Co., 275 Or. 421, 551 P.2d 449 (1976).
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creates a great deal of tension with the policy promoting settlement.
This approach was taken in Lum v. Sinnet6° where Mary Carter agree-
ments were found inimical to the adversary process. It is true that, if
left unfettered, Mary Carter agreements are not conducive to the adver-
sary setting desired in our legal system. By reaching the decision it did
however, Nevada has taken an inflexible approach and has disregarded
a strong, deeply rooted policy advocating settlement. More flexibility
should have been demonstrated.
Even if this flexibility does not approach that of some jurisdic-
tions,61 the court, at the least, might have used what may be referred to
as partial voidability. This is the approach taken in Cox v. Kelsey-
Hayes,62 a case decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Under this
approach, the agreement would remain enforceable except when the
settling defendant remains as a defendant in the lawsuit.6 3 This accom-
modates very well the competing policies of providing the defendant
with a fair trial and allowing the plaintiff freedom to settle. Plaintiff is
allowed assurance of a certain amount of damages while the defendant
is given a chance to settle and possibly absolve himself of all liability.
It might, however, be argued that requiring the settling defendant to
cease participation in the lawsuit would, under certain circumstances,
make a settlement impossible; for example, where it is clear that the
fault of the settling defendant is appreciable. If the plaintiff is forced to
drop that defendant, he is jeopardizing his chances of winning the law-
suit. If the remaining defendant clearly has some fault, but of slight
degree, the chance of convincing a jury is tenuous. In the alternative, if
60. 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971).
61. See notes 26-59 supra and accompanying text.
62. 49 OKLA. B.J. 2157 (1978).
63. See Settlement Devices, supra note 2, where this approach was foreseen: "Caution should
* . . be observed in negotiating. . . Mary Carter Agreements, since it appears that if a complain-
ant and one of the co-obligors determine all rights and responsibilities between them, then such
obligor will lose his standing to remain in the proceedings." Id at 775. See also Comment, Mary
Carter Agreements: Unfair and Unnecessary, 32 Sw. L.J. 779 (1978). "Since no justiciable issues
exist between the parties entering the Mary Carter agreement, dismissing the settling defendant is
appropriate." Id at 800 (footnote omitted). However, that author does not feel that requiring the
settling defendant to remain out of the lawsuit is an acceptable rationale for allowing enforcement
of the Mary Carter agreement. He cites two reasons for this.
First, severance forces the nonsetting defendant to participate in two separate pro-
ceedings, merely because a co-defendant entered an unrighteous agreement to avoid lia-
bility. Severing a cross-action for contribution thus may penalize the innocent party.
Secondly, the testimony of a joint tortfeasor is generally desirable evidence in joint tort
cases.
Id at 801. See also Hemet Dodge v. Gryder, 23 Ariz. App. 523, -., 534 P.2d 454, 461 (1975) (the
court found that severance of the settling defendant was in the discretion of the trial court).
[Vol. 14:744
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the settling defendant remains in the lawsuit, his greater degree of fault
will ease the plaintiffs burden of convincing the jury and more likely
will result in a plaintiffs verdict. In light of joint and several liability,
the non-settling defendant may then find himself solely liable for the
entire judgment. Due to his slight degree of fault, such a result would
be improbable if he alone were the defendant.
B. Atdmissibility of the Agreement
A major complaint leveled against the use of Mary Carter agree-
ments is that they present a distorted view of the case to the jury.
Courts attempt to remedy this by admitting the Mary Carter agreement
into evidence. Admission of settlement agreements into evidence has
traditionally been disfavored. The fear was that the jury would use
such settlements as admissions of guilt.6' In spite of this, jurisdictions
dealing with Mary Carter agreements have concluded that admission
of the agreement into evidence is permissible.6"
Admission of the settlement into evidence raises two questions.
For what purpose and to what extent should the agreement be admit-
ted? Some courts have allowed the settlement to be admitted only for
attacking a witness' credibility66 while others have allowed admission
of the settlement for substantive purposes.67 In order to determine
64. See notes 69-73 infra.
65. General Portland Land Dev. Co. v. Stevens, 291 So. 2d 250, 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (court found that production alone was not enough but that the agreement must be admitted
into evidence); Cox v. Kelsey Hayes Co., 49 OKLA. B.J. 2157, 2160 (1978) (court held that the
agreement may be admitted at the discretion of the trial court); Grillo v. Burke's Pain Co., 275 Or.
421, __, 551 P.2d 449, 453 (1976); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 857 (1977)
(court found that failure to admit the agreement into evidence was reversible error).
66. "[T]he disclosure [of a Mary Carter agreement] is required so as to enable the trier of fact,
i.e. the jury, to be fully apprised of all factors bearing upon the testimony and conduct of the
signing as well as non-signing parties." Atlantic Ambulance Inc. v. Asbury, 330 So. 2d 477, 478
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1975). "[E]vidence of the. . . agreement in any case may be considered solely
on the issue of motive and credibility of witnesses and not on the liability or damage issues."
Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356, _ 303 N.E.2d 382, 387 (1973). "The
existence of the settlement may be considered only on the issue of motive and credibility of the
witness and not on the issue of liability." Bedford School Dist. v. Caron Const. Co., 116 N.H. 800,
-, 367 A.2d 1051, 1055 (1976). "We conclude that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
the settlement agreement which was properly offered. . . for the purpose of showing. . . bias or
credibility." Bristol Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1978).
67. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973); Grillo v. Burkes Paint Co., 275 Or. 421,
551 P.2d 449, 453 (1976) (the court speaks only of admitting the agreement into evidence and
never addresses the issue of limiting its use); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855,
857 (rex. 1977) (court never suggests a limiting instruction and says that parties' financial interests
are proper areas of inquiry on direct or cross-examination).
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which approach is preferable it is necessary to examine the underlying
rational for allowing admission of the settlement into evidence.
One of the fears present when a Mary Carter agreement exists,
which is not present in a traditional settlement agreement, is that the
settling defendant, because of his financial interest in the outcome, will
perjure his testimony. In order for this to be brought to the attention of
the jury, allowing them to weigh the testimony accordingly, it is neces-
sary that the credibility of the witness be attacked. 68 By admitting the
agreement into evidence, the motive that might drive the witness to lie
is brought to the jury's attention. The problem, however, is the damage
that necessarily occurs when the settlement is admitted into evidence.
Knowing that the agreement will be admitted into evidence, and aware
of its great potential for prejudice as an implicit admission, parties may
be hesitant to settle.69 There is the possibility that the settlement evi-
dence will be used substantively by the jury, rather than for the limited
purpose of attacking credibility.70
This creates no problem for those who advocate admission of the
agreement for purposes other than attacking credibility. If, however,
the only desired purpose of admission is to attack credibility, a di-
lemma is created. The desire to have the witness' testimony fairly eval-
uated must be balanced against the possibility that the jury will use the
agreement for substantive purposes. In light of the nature of a Mary
Carter agreement and its perjurious influence on a settling defendant's
testimony, it would seem best to admit it for the purpose of attacking
credibility in the hope that the jury heeds the limiting instruction from
the judge.
When the Mary Carter agreement is admitted for purposes other
than attacking credibility, the court is allowing it to bear on the jury's
68. "The need for evaluating the credibility of the witness may be as insistent as the policy of
encouraging compromise." MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 274 at 665
(2d ed. 1972).
69. The agreement may be found to be an admission by the plaintiff of his damages. "For
example if the jury is told the amount which the defendant agreed to pay, it might erroneously
conclude that thd sum is the plaintiff's estimate of his damages." Beckford School Dist. v. Caron
Constr. Co., 116 N.W. 800, -, 367 A.2d 1051, 1054 (1976).
70. An instruction may not always be effective, but admission of the evidence with the limit-
ing instruction is normally the best available reconciliation of the respective interests. It seems,
however, that in situations, where the danger of the jury's misuse of the evidence for the incompe-
tent purpose is great, and its value for the legitimate purpose is slight or the point for which it is
competent can readily be proved by other evidence, the judge's power to exclude the evidence
altogether would be recognized. MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 59 at
136 (2d ed. 1972).
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determination of fault. In light of the treatment courts have given
other settlement agreements, this is not justified. It is difficult to per-
ceive why a Mary Carter agreement would be any more or less indica-
tive of fault than any other type of settlement agreement.7' Courts
which have not limited the admissibility of Mary Carter agreements
have done so in order that the jury will not only be fully apprised of the
testimony of the settling defendant but also of the "conduct of the sign-
ing as well as the non-signing parties. 72 Seemingly, the same result
could be achieved by using the evidence only to attack credibility. In
light of the ineffectiveness of a limiting instruction,73 once the posture
of the settling defendant is disclosed to the jury, they will reach their
own explanation for the conduct of the parties. While this result may
be unavoidable it need not be condoned by omitting a limiting instruc-
tion. The danger that the settlement evidence will be used by the jury
to conclusively establish fault seems of such magnitude that a limiting
instruction should be required. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held in
Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes74 that "any pretrial agreement between plaintiff
and a defendant must be revealed to all parties and the court prior to
trial and to the jury in some appropriate degree to be decided by the
trial court."75 Limiting the use of the settlement agreement to im-
peachment of testimony should be part of the "appropriate degree."
Once it is determined that the Mary Carter agreement should be
admitted into evidence for some purpose, it must then be determined to
what extent it will be admitted. There are three choices available to the
court: (1) disclosure of the agreement's existence; (2) disclosure of all
the terms of the agreement except for the amount; or, (3) disclosure of
all the terms of the agreement including the amount. It is possible that
"the extent to which a settlement should be disclosed to the jury will
vary from case to case and must rest in the sound discretion of the trial
71. McCormick finds that "[t]he relevancy of the offer will vary according to circumstances,
with a very small offer of payment to settle a very large claim being much more readily construed
as a desire for peace rather than an admission of weakness of position. Relevancy would increse,
however, as the amount of the offer approached the amount of the claim." Id. at 663. This same
rational would seem to hold to Mary Carter agreements. The offer at issue would be the ceiling
the settling defendant has set on his possible liability for damages. Simply because there exists a
chance that the settling defendant's damages may be less than his original offer does not seem to
have any effect on the relevancy of the offer as it relates to liability. The higher the ceiling on the
settling defendant's damages the more indicative it would be of liability.
72. Atl. Ambulance v. Asbury, 330 So. 2d 477, 478 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1975).
73. McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 59 at 136 (2d ed. 1972).
74. 49 OKLA. B.J. 2157 (1978).
75. Id at 2160.
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court. ' 76 This was the approach taken by the court in COX°7 7 While
this allows for the greatest flexibility, it would seem preferable to have
more concrete guidelines. By having specific parameters governing the
extent to which the agreement will be disclosed, parties can make a
more informed pretrial determination of the desirability of entering
into a settlement. For example, if admission is limited to showing only
the agreement's existence, the plaintiff will know the degree of
prejudice that is likely to result at trial and will be better able to bal-
ance this against the benefits resulting from settlement. If admission is
dealt with on an ad hoc basis, the plaintiff will not be able to accurately
quantify the prejudice that is likely to result from admission. In turn,
he will not be able effectively to balance the pluses and minuses that go
into determining the desirability of a settlement. Absent concrete
guidelines, the end result would doubtless be fewer settlements.
In limiting the admission of the settlement to the extent of showing
its existence, there is a possibility of prejudice to both parties. The non-
settling defendant may be prejudiced by the jury's assumption that in-
asmuch as one defendant has admitted liability the other must also be
liable. The plaintiff may be prejudiced by the jury's assumption that
the responsible party, namely the settling defendant, has already come
forward.78 If the terms of the Mary Carter agreement are admitted into
evidence they may aid in explaining the relative positions of the parties
and correct any faulty inferences the jury may have made knowing
only of the agreement's existence.
A problem with admitting the terms of the agreement is the possi-
bility that the settling parties will include inculpating statements. 79
This difficulty could be alleviated by admitting the agreement in an
excised form. 0 This approach, however, has been disapproved by at
least one court which found "admission of a Mary Carter agreement in
a modified and excised form. . . was prejudicial.""' When the agree-
76. Frey v. Snelgrove, - Minn. -, 269 N.W.2d 918 (1978).
77. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 69 supra.
79. Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 42, -, 488 P.2d 347, 352 (1971).
80. Finding the excising of inculpating statements a very attractive approach, it has been said
that "the possibility of placing a non-signing defendant between 'the devil and the deep blue sea'
via the insertion of self-serving declarations in the agreement does not pose a serious problem."
Limitation On LiabilityAgreements, supra note 30, at 992. That author found an analogy in crimi-
nal cases where parts of confessions relating to other defendants or other crimes are excised before
the confession is admitted. Id at 988 n.30.
81. Swanson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 349 So. 2d 202, 202 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1977).
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ment is admitted in an excised form, the same fears exist that are pres-
ent when the jury is only made aware of the agreement's existence.
Omission of certain parts of the agreement could allow the jury to
make incorrect inferences which might possibly prejudice either party.
The best approach would seem to be admission of the agreement,
including its terms, into evidence excising any inculpating statements
unless they are absolutely necessary to an understanding of the agree-
ment. If it is found that the inculpating statements are necessary and
therefore must be included, the harm should be minimal in light of the
jury's knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the agreement .2
These guidelines should dictate the appropriate degree of admission
when it is left to the court's discretion.83
The final question to be addressed in considering the extent to
which an agreement should be admitted is whether the amount of the
settlement should be disclosed to the jury. One court has said that it
"can visualize no circumstances where the amount involved in a release
or covenant need be disclosed to the jury. ' 84 There is a likelihood, if
the court allows admission of the amount of the settlement, that the
plaintiff will be unduly prejudiced. A jury might use the settlement
figure as an estimate of the plaintiffs damages and lose sight of the
actual damages suffered. The amount of the settlement might be used
by the jury as bearing on the strength of a particular party's case, a fact
which may sometimes be true but which nonetheless has been generally
rejected.85 Any benefit that might exist if the amount is admitted into
evidence is greatly outweighed by the harm admission would impart.
The desired result, making the jury aware of the defendant's posi-
tion and its effect upon his testimony, could seemingly be achieved by
admission of only the agreement's existence and terms. When the
amount of the agreement is admitted into evidence, the danger is high
that the jury will use this to conclusively establish the existence of lia-
bility and the extent of the damages. For this reason the amount of the
settlement should not be admitted.
82. Ideally the inculpating statements would be excluded in order to protect the non-settling
defendant. However, it might be that, in the absence of the inculpating terms, the inferences
drawn by the jury will be more prejudicial. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text. The
court should balance these prejudices and determine which course of action is most favorable to
the non-settling defendant.
83. 49 OKLA. BJ. at 2160.
84. Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, _, 200 N.W.2d 134, 139 (1972).
85. See note 69 supra.
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The Supreme Court of Alaska in Breitkreutz v. Baker86 ap-
proached the problem of dealing with the settling defendant who re-
mains in the lawsuit in an interesting way.87 The court extensively
limited the role which the settling defendant was allowed to play. The
settling defendant was restricted in his voir dire of the jury; not allowed
to put witnesses on except in a limited capacity; and prohibited from
having instructions given to the jury relating to his liability.8 By tak-
ing this approach, the court allowed the settling defendant to remain in
the lawsuit, thereby preserving the fairness of the trial toward the
plaintiff. While certainly not the optimum situation for the plaintiff, it
is a very appealing compromise position. The compromise does not
allow the settling defendant to actively pursue the plaintiff's case. This
is the same result that is reached when the settling defendant is severed
from the lawsuit. However, by allowing the settling defendant to re-
main in the lawsuit, the plaintiff receives the benefit of presenting the
settling party not only as a favorable witness but also as a defendant.
In taking this approach, a court would not be as apt to discourage a
plaintiff from settling as when it required the settling defendant be sev-
ered from the lawsuit.8 9 The nonsettling defendant(s) would have the
benefit of the settling defendant appearing neutral in the case.
The court in Breitkrutz felt that by limiting the settling defendant's
participation in this manner the jury's view of the case was not as apt to
be distorted.9" In light of the benefits received by the plaintiff in al-
lowing the settling defendant to remain in the lawsuit, this may not be
true. Even recognizing the effectiveness of limiting the settling defend-
ant's participation, the court in Breitkrutz hinted that it might still be
best if the settling defendant were severed from the lawsuit.91
V. CONCLUSION
Mary Carter agreements present a unique type of settlement agree-
86. 514 P.2d 17 (Alaska 1973).
87. It is not exactly clear what the agreement in Breitkreutz involved. However, it is clear
that it limited the settling defendant's liability and the court hinted that it might be best if the
settling defendant were severed from the lawsuit. "There is some question in our minds as to
whether the trial court should have allowed [the settling defendant] to remain as a nominal de-
fendant in this case. The question arises because [he] had no interest in the case and there would
seem to be no 'actual controversy' as to him." Id at 29 n.29.
88. Id at 28.
89. See section IVA supra.
90. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
91. There is some question as to whether there exists an actual controversy as to the settling
defendant. 514 P.2d 17, 29 n.29. See note 62 supra.
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ment for use in lawsuits involving multiple defendants. The treatment
given them by the courts is a result of the balancing of two important
policies: the desire to promote settlement and the desire to maintain a
true adversarial trial with the actual positions of the parties known to
the jury. The recent trend has been to sacrifice the former policy for
the latter. Caution should be exercised before such a step is taken in
light of the importance and necessity of pretrial settlement. Possible
remedial measures should be given careful consideration in an attempt
to arrive at a true compromise position. Such a position should accom-
modate the interests of those parties desiring a settlement as well as the
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